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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
LEWIS, Circuit Judge. 
 
Jimmy Lee Cooper was convicted of tampering with a 
government informant. Because we find that there was 





On October 3, 1995, Cooper was indicted on two counts 
of tampering with a government informant, in violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3), in the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The charges 
stemmed from events that occurred during the course of a 
joint drug investigation by the Bristol Township Police 
Department (BTPD) and the Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA). 
 
On April 13, 1995, Kinny Hicks, the informant, arranged 
to meet Cooper to purchase crack cocaine. Prior to the 
meeting, DEA agents searched Hicks, gave him $700 and 
equipped him with a body recorder and electronic 
transmitter. At the meeting, Cooper sold Hicks a white 
substance for $700. After the meeting, Hicks turned the 
substance over to the DEA. The DEA then conducted a 
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preliminary field test which showed that the substance 
"reacted positive to the presence of a caine derivative . . . 
meaning lidocaine, procaine, or cocaine." S.A. at 9a-10a. 
On May 31, 1995, the substance was sent to a DEA lab for 
a full drug analysis. 
 
On June 23, 1995, Hicks again contacted Cooper in order 
to arrange a purchase of one and one-half ounces of crack. 
Prior to this meeting, Hicks met again with DEA agents, 
who searched him, gave him $1,400 and equipped him with 
a body recorder and electronic transmitter. Hicks then went 
to meet Cooper. At around 6:00 p.m., Cooper and two of his 
friends arrived by car. Hicks entered the car and Cooper 
tried to give him a bag containing white powder. Hicks did 
not accept it, stating that he wanted crack and not cocaine 
powder. 
 
After failing to convince Hicks to take the powder, Cooper 
told him that his friends would get the powder "cooked up." 
A. at 22. Hicks then left the car and waited. Around 
6:30 p.m., Cooper spoke again with Hicks about the delay. 
At that time, Cooper spotted an unmarked police car 
containing a DEA agent. He charged the car and began 
"sticking his tongue out and pointing at himself, saying, uh 
huh, this is me right here." A. at 24. He then accused Hicks 
of trying to set him up and ordered one of his friends to get 
his gun because he was going to kill Hicks. Hicks 
subsequently left the scene and was picked up by DEA 
agents. 
 
Later that evening, Cooper called the BTPD and told a 
BTPD detective that he knew Hicks "was a cop . . . or police 
and that he was going to fuck up Kinny Hicks." S.A. at 51- 
52. He also called Hicks' home and told Kinny Hicks' 
brother that Kinny had set him up. Later in June, he told 
Jermaine Perry, a mutual acquaintance, that Hicks had set 
him up and that "when I see him I'm going to fuck him up." 
S.A. at 61. On August 2, 1995, Cooper spotted Hicks at a 
store and told him that he "had better watch[his] back." A. 
at 33. 
 
The substance that Cooper attempted to sell to Hicks on 
June 23 was never recovered. In July 1995, the DEA 
learned that the substance that Hicks bought from Cooper 
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on April 3, 1995, was procaine, which is not a controlled 
substance. 
 
At trial, the government presented testimony from Hicks 
and other witnesses concerning these threats. At the 
conclusion of the trial, the district court instructed the jury 
that the government had the burden of proving that Cooper 
"knowingly used intimidation and threats against a 
government informant with the intent to hinder, delay or 
prevent the communication to a law enforcement officer, 
here the drug enforcement agents, of information relating to 
the commission or possible commission of a federal offense, 
in this instance trafficking in drugs." A. at 90. The court 
also instructed the jury that "[s]elling drugs, such as 
cocaine powder or crack, is a federal offense. So is selling 
what is called a counterfeit substance as though it were the 
genuine controlled substance, such as cocaine." A. at 91. 
There were no objections to these instructions. On March 
20, 1996, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on both 
counts. On August 22, 1996, Cooper was sentenced to 42 
months on each count, to be served concurrently. 
 
The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 




Cooper makes three arguments on appeal: (1) there was 
insufficient evidence to support his conviction for tampering 
with a witness; (2) the jury instructions were flawed; and (3) 
he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his 
attorney failed to object to plainly erroneous jury 
instructions. Cooper argues that, as a result, his conviction 
must be reversed and that a retrial is barred by the Double 
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.1  
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The Double Jeopardy Clause provides that no person shall "be subject 
for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy." U.S. Const. amend. V. 
Thus, "when a defendant's conviction is reversed by an appellate court 
on the sole ground that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the 
jury's verdict, the Double Jeopardy Clause bars a retrial on the same 
charge." Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 39 (1988); Taberer v. Armstrong 
World Indus., Inc., 954 F.2d 888, 908 (3d Cir. 1992). 
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The government concedes that the jury instructions were 
flawed but argues that the case should be remanded for a 
new trial because there is sufficient evidence to convict 
Cooper. As a result of this concession, we need only 
address Cooper's first claim.2 
 
"A claim of insufficiency of evidence places a very heavy 
burden on the appellant." United States v. Coyle, 63 F.3d 
1239, 1243 (3d Cir. 1995). In such cases, we must"view 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the government." 
Id. Moreover, we "must affirm the conviction[ ] if a rational 
trier of fact could have found [the] defendant guilty beyond 
a reasonable doubt, and the verdict is supported by 
substantial evidence." Id. If there is substantial evidence to 
support the jury's determination, we will "not disturb the 
verdict although on that evidence we might not have made 
the same decision." United States v. Hannigan , 27 F.3d 




18 U.S.C. § 1512, "Tampering with a witness, victim, or 
an informant" (the "Witness Tampering Statute"), provides, 
in relevant part: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The district court instructed the jury, without objection from trial 
counsel, that the third essential element of witness tampering in this 
case was that Cooper was involved in "trafficking in drugs." A. at 91. The 
court then instructed the jury, again without objection, that "selling 
drugs, such as cocaine powder or crack, is a federal offense. So is selling 
what is called a counterfeit substance as though it were the genuine 
substance, such as cocaine." Id. 
 
There was insufficient evidence presented at trial from which the jury 
could properly conclude that Cooper threatened the government 
informant in relation to "trafficking in drugs," or specifically, the sale of 
a counterfeit substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C.§ 841(a)(2). And 
because the district court misapplied the term "counterfeit substance," 
see infra IIB, there is a strong possibility that the jury may have 
improperly convicted Cooper of witness tampering if it had understood 
the jury instructions to mean that one could be guilty of drug trafficking 
if one sold procaine as if it were cocaine. The government concedes this 
point. This concession moots the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 
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Whoever knowingly uses intimidation or physical force, 
threatens, or corruptly persuades another person, or 
attempts to do so, or engages in misleading conduct 
toward another person, with intent to . . . 
 
hinder, delay, or prevent the communication to a law 
enforcement officer or a judge of the United States of 
information relating to the commission or possible 
commission of a Federal offense or a violation of 
conditions of probation, parole, or release pending 
judicial proceedings; 
 
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more 
than ten years, or both. 
 
18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3) (emphasis added.) 
 
In United States v. Stansfield, 101 F.3d 909 (3d Cir. 
1996), we considered a substantially similar provision of 
the Witness Tampering Statute, section 1512(a)(1)(C). The 
essential elements of an offense under that section are: 
 
(1) the defendant killed or attempted to kill a person; 
 
(2) the defendant was motivated by a desire to prevent 
    the communication between the informant and 
    law enforcement authorities concerning the 
    commission or possible commission of an offense; 
 
(3) the offense was actually a federal offense; 
 
(4) the defendant believed that the informant might 
    communicate with the federal authorities. 
 
See id. at 918. Stansfield's analysis applies as well to 





Cooper argues that the government failed to prove the 
third Stansfield element, "the offense was actually a federal 
offense."3 The government concedes that there was no 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Cooper also argues that Stansfield requires that the government prove 
that a defendant charged under the Witness Tampering Statute believe 
 
                                6 
evidence presented at trial from which the jury could 
properly conclude that Cooper threatened Hicks in relation 
to the actual sale of a controlled substance or counterfeit 
substance. However, the government argues that there was 
sufficient evidence to prove another underlying crime: 
attempted sale of a controlled substance, a violation of 21 
U.S.C. § 846. 
 
We agree that the evidence does not support a finding 
that there was an actual underlying sale of a controlled or 
counterfeit substance. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) provides in 
relevant part, that 
 
it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or 
intentionally -- 
 
(1) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess 
with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a 
controlled substance; or 
 
(2) to create, distribute, or dispense, or possession 
with intent to distribute or dispense, a counterfeit 
substance. 
 
21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1981). Because it is undisputed that 
procaine is not a "controlled substance" under federal law, 
see 21 U.S.C. § 812 (1981) (listing controlled substances), 
there is no evidence here of an actual sale of drugs in 
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)(1981). 
 
Moreover, 21 U.S.C. § 802(7) provides that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
that the person threatened would communicate with federal law 
enforcement agents. Here, Cooper testified that he believed that he was 
under surveillance by BTPD. Moreover, a BTPD Detective testified that 
he told Cooper on June 23 that he was the subject of a local law 
enforcement investigation. Cooper argues that there is no basis in fact to 
infer that he believed that Hicks worked for and would communicate 
with federal law enforcement agents. Such a belief is unnecessary for 
Cooper to have violated the Witness Tampering Statute. See United 
States of America v. Bell, 1997 WL 269404, *5 (3rd Cir. May 22, 1997) 
("What our analysis renders irrelevant is the defendant's `mental state' 
regarding the fact that the officer is a federal officer" for the purposes of 
the Witness Tampering Statute). 
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[t]he term `counterfeit substance' means a controlled 
substance which, or the container or labeling of which, 
without authorization, bears the trademark, trade 
name, or other identifying mark, imprint, number, or 
device, or any likeness thereof, of a manufacturer, 
distributor, or dispenser other than the person or 
persons who in fact manufactured, distributed, or 
dispensed such substance and which thereby falsely 
purports or is represented to be the product of, or to 
have been distributed by, such other manufacturer, 
distributor, or dispenser. 
 
21 U.S.C. § 802(7)(1981) (emphasis added.) By definition, a 
"counterfeit substance" is a "controlled substance." If a 
particular substance is not a "controlled substance," then it 
cannot be a "counterfeit substance" within the meaning of 
Section 802(7). Because procaine is not a controlled 
substance, it cannot be a counterfeit substance. Thus, the 
sale of procaine cannot amount to a sale of a counterfeit 
substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(2) (1981). 
 
Despite this, the government argues that the evidence 
presented at trial could support a jury's finding that Cooper 
threatened the government informant in relation to an 
attempt to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 
§ 846. That section provides: 
 
Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any 
offense defined in this subchapter [including 21 U.S.C. 
§ 841(a)(1), which makes it unlawful to distribute or 
possess with intent to distribute cocaine] shall be 
subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for 
the offense, the commission of which was the object of 
the attempt or conspiracy. 
 
21 U.S.C. § 846 (1997). 
 
In United States v. Everett, 700 F.2d 900 (3d Cir. 1983), 
we held that in order for a defendant to be found 
guilty of attempt under section 846, the government 
must "introduce some measure of objective evidence 
corroborating the attempted distribution of a controlled 
substance." Everett, 700 F.2d at 908. In that case, Everett 
was convicted of attempting to distribute P-2-P (a controlled 
substance) even though the substance he actually had was 
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a non-controlled substance. We found sufficient evidence to 
support the jury's finding because 
 
[t]he government established not only that Everett 
promised to sell a controlled substance and that he 
transferred the substance furtively, but also that 
immediately after arrest and proper Miranda warnings 
Everett confessed, identifying the substance he had 
distributed as P-2-P and revealing that he had gotten 
his P-2-P from Joseph Jackson who had obtained it 
from Frank. This statement unequivocally marked his 
conduct as an attempt to distribute P-2-P. 
 
Id. at 909. We concluded that "the objective acts performed, 
without any reliance on the accompanying mens rea, mark 
the defendant's conduct as criminal in nature." Id. (quoting 
United States v. Oviedo, 525 F.2d 881, 885 (5th Cir. 1976)). 
Thus, a defendant can be guilty of an attempt to sell drugs 
even if the purported drugs turn out to be a non-controlled 
substance. In other words, impossibility is not a defense to 
the charge of attempted distribution of a controlled 
substance. Id. at 908. 
 
We also emphasized, however, that we require a strong 
evidentiary basis to support a finding of attempt in the 
absence of the drug itself. Id. at 909 ("The acts should be 
unique rather than so commonplace that they are engaged 
in by persons not in violation of the law.") (quoting United 
States v. Oviedo, 525 F.2d 881, 885 (5th Cir. 1976)). 
 
The Fifth Circuit has taken substantially the same 
approach in Oviedo, finding that "the objective conduct of 
the defendant must strongly corroborate the firmness of the 
defendant's criminal intent." Oviedo, 525 F.2d at 886. 
There, the court found that the evidence was insufficient 
where there were only 
 
two objective facts. First, Oviedo told the agent that the 
substance he was selling was heroin, and second, 
portions of the substance were concealed in a television 
set. If another objective fact were present, if the 
substance were heroin, we would have a strong 
objective basis for the determination of criminal intent 
and conduct consistent with and supportive of that 
intent . . . . But when this objective basis for the 
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determination of intent is removed, when the 
substance is not heroin, the conduct becomes 
ambivalent . . . . We cannot conclude that the objective 
acts of Oviedo apart from any indirect evidence of 
intent mark his conduct as criminal in nature. Rather, 
those acts are consistent with a non-criminal 
enterprise. 
 
Id. at 882. 
 
In United States v. Hough, 561 F.2d 594, 595 (5th Cir. 
1977), the Fifth Circuit again emphasized that objective 
facts proven at trial must be "unequivocally corroborative of 
criminal intent" before it could find sufficient evidence of 
attempt to distribute a controlled substance. While 
affirming Hough's conviction in the absence of a genuine 
controlled substance, the court noted that 
 
if the only fact on this record were Hough's negotiation 
for the sale of a non-narcotic substance, Oviedo  would 
compel the court to grant the defendant's motion to 
vacate his guilty plea. There is also present, however, 
an objective fact which is unequivocally corroborative 
of criminal intent: Hough's statement, under oath and 
before a court of law, that he did in fact do those 
things that the Assistant United States Attorney recited 
(i.e., negotiated for sale a substance he admittedly 




The government argues that there was sufficient objective 
evidence to show that on June 23rd, Cooper attempted to 
sell Hicks cocaine even though the powder was not 
recovered. It relies on the following evidence: Cooper 
contacted Hicks by telephone and negotiated a sale of one 
and one-half ounces of crack cocaine for $1,400; he met 
Hicks and attempted to give him a bag containing a white 
powdery substance which he stated was cocaine; and he 
agreed to get the substance "cooked up" into crack. This 
evidence, the government argues, proves that Cooper 
believed that he was selling genuine cocaine. 
 
Cooper responds that the most compelling inference 
regarding the events of June 23rd is that he was attempting 
 
                                10 
to defraud Hicks by selling him procaine and telling him 
that it was cocaine, just as he had done on April 13th. He 
relies on the following evidence to support this position. On 
June 23, Hicks handed the substance back to Cooper"and 
told him that is not what I wanted." A. at 22. Hicks also 
testified that Cooper was trying to "pass" that substance 
"off to me as crack," that he told Cooper that it was not 
crack and that he "knew that it didn't have to be cooked 
up." Id. Moreover, Cooper notes that his statements on 
June 23rd were virtually identical to those he made on 
April 13th, when he had sold procaine as if it were cocaine. 
Finally, he argues that his antagonistic behavior toward law 
enforcement agents -- sticking out his tongue at an 
undercover agent and later calling the Bristol Township 
Police Department -- were inconsistent with actions of one 
who believed that he was involved in a genuine drug deal. 
 
Although the government is entitled to have the evidence 
viewed in the best possible light, Cooper's arguments are 
compelling. A substantial possibility exists that Cooper was 
perpetrating a fraud on Hicks, like the one that he had 
committed on April 13th. Moreover, unlike in Everett and 
Hough, there is no post-arrest admission by the defendant 
which would provide strong objective evidence of an 
attempt to commit a narcotics offense. Nor has the 
government recovered a genuine controlled substance, 
which would also provide strong objective evidence. See 
Oviedo, 525 F.2d at 882. In our view, the government has 
not provided sufficient evidence to convict Cooper of a 
violation of the Witness Tampering Statute where the 
underlying offense is attempt to sell cocaine in violation of 
21 U.S.C. § 846.4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. After oral argument, the government also argued that 
 
clearly the protections afforded to a government informant (who is 
assisting DEA in a lawful drug investigation which is based on 
representations by the defendant that he is dealing cocaine) under 
the witness tampering statute should not be predicated on whether 
the drugs sold by the defendant were in fact a controlled substance 
or believed by the appellant to be a controlled substance. 
 
Appellee's Second Supplemental Brief at 1. To hold otherwise, the 
government argues, would undermine the purpose of the statute, which 
is to ensure that people come forward to testify at criminal trials. 
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For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that there was 
insufficient evidence to support Cooper's conviction for 
tampering with a government informant. We further 
conclude that a retrial is barred by the Double Jeopardy 
Clause. See Lockhart, 488, U.S. at 39; Taberer, 954 F.2d at 
908 ("[T]he double jeopardy clause prohibits retrial when 
the government has failed to present minimally sufficient 




Because there was insufficient evidence to support the 
jury's guilty verdict, we will reverse Cooper's conviction and 
direct the entry of a judgment of acquittal. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
As we noted above, this position is inconsistent with the plain 
language of the statute. The statute requires that the offense was 
actually a federal offense. 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3); Stansfield, 101 F.3d at 
918. Moreover, as Cooper notes, Pennsylvania has an analogous witness 
tampering statute that protects persons not within the reach of the 
federal statute. See 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 4952(a) (Purdon's 1983) (punishing 
persons who threaten or intimidate a witness or victim with the intent to 
"impede, impair, prevent or interfere with the administration of criminal 
justice . . . ."). 
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